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Structured Abstract 
Purpose: To develop a combined social constructivist, internal and external 
conceptualisation of the process of realising offshore wind farms, and to investigate costs, 
time, delays and operational performance results of offshore wind farm power plant projects 
in Denmark and Sweden with a view to possible strategic misrepresentation. 
Design/methodology/approach: Desk study of a sample of seven Danish and Swedish 
offshore wind farms using triangulation of publicly available material. 
Findings: Some of the wind farm projects are successful and some less successful. In the 
latter group, budget and time overruns and under-performance are found. The paper discusses 
specific elements of possible strategic misrepresentation but finds a contradictory pattern. 
Also competences developed on the basis of experience do not produce clear results, since 
more recent wind farm performance is poorer than earlier. 
Research limitations/implications: If desk research were combined with other methods, it 
would be possible to detect projects’ internal phenomena better. 
Practical implications: There is a need to improve the efficiency of the wind farm building 
process and to improve the quality of offshore wind turbines, their foundations and cabling. 
Originality/value: Renewable energy power plants comprise an important societal 
investment, yet their costs and possible cost reductions are poorly understood.  
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Introduction 
 
The installation and operation of offshore wind farms are complex endeavours. They 
encompass large power plants of wind turbines as well as smaller near-shore farms, and the 
growth in demand for installations is significant. For example, the EU member states’ energy 
renewal plans for 2020 alone represent investments in around 43 GW offshore wind farms 
(EWEA 2012). These investments are being made under the present harsh financial 
conditions, which should generate particular interest in producing renewable energy power 
plants that are just as cost efficient, and are able to yield maximum benefit in the form of 
produced power. In relation to this situation, the aims of this study are twofold:  
 First, to develop a combined social constructivist internal and external 
conceptualisation of the process of realising offshore wind farms, and  
 Second, to investigate costs, time, delays and operational performance of offshore 
wind farm power plant projects in Denmark and Sweden with a view to possible 
strategic misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg 2009).  
Strategic misrepresentation conceptualises the situation in which project promoters first 
purposely reduce the cost and time required, and then lever the project’s positive impacts in 
terms of its operational performance and its value for future users in order to make the project 
attractive (Flyvbjerg, 2011). Pursuing the stated aims makes it is possible to discuss whether 
a cluster of successive projects leads to other patterns of cost, time and operational 
performance than would projects that stand alone. 
   
The theoretical framework developed below adopts a social constructivist approach (Latour, 
2005), more specifically thoroughgoing interpretivism (Woolgar and Grint, 1997). The 
empirical material encompasses data on seven offshore wind farms, six Danish and one 
Swedish, constructed between 2001 and 2010.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: It begins with a method, followed by theory, case 
description, discussion and a conclusion. 
 
Methodology 
 
The research design matches the two main aims of the article:  
 
The first research question, which involves the theoretical framework, is answered by 
combining both external and internal perspectives on offshore wind farms. The external 
perspectives are critical studies of megaprojects (Flyvbjerg, 2009; 2011) and complex 
engineering project management contributions (Davies and Hobday, 2005; Miller and 
Lessard, 2008). The internal perspectives are formed using operation strategy and operation 
management concepts (Slack and Lewis, 2008; Slack et al., 2007). Science, Technology and 
Society (STS) approaches (Hughes, 1983; Latour, 1987; 2005; Grint and Woolgar, 1997) act 
as the overall framework within which the understanding of offshore wind farms is achieved. 
This implies, essentially, that they are thoroughly negotiated, have inseparable social and 
technical aspects and operate in a semi-public environment involving a substantial amount of 
public performance – i.e. they are present in a public space (with e.g. media and political 
attention).  
 
The second research question, which involves the empirical part, is answered by investigating 
the external and internal aspects. The external aspects are costs, time, delay and operational 
performance in relation to strategic misrepresentation; the internal aspects are the operational 
strategy elements.  
 
The investigations of both aspects are carried out in an exploratory investigative manner with 
focus on a core set of data from a selection of Danish and Swedish offshore wind farms that 
comprises the largest farms in this geographical area that have also run for some time. They 
therefore encompass operational experience that makes it possible to evaluate the aspect of 
possible strategic misrepresentation. The sample includes six Danish farms and one Swedish 
(Horns Rev I, Horns Rev II, Lillgrund (SE), Middelgrunden, Nysted, Rødsand II, and Samsø), 
which also constitute a considerable basis of experience for a recurrent group of companies. 
The selection excludes some smaller Danish and Swedish wind farms from this study, such as 
Frederikshavn (DK), Sprogø (DK), Vindeby (DK) and Yttre Stengrund (SE).  
 
The central tool for the empirical work has been a desk study using internet sources (such as 
www.4Coffshore.com). The analysis thus relies on secondary data from publicly accessible 
sources. This is justified by the characteristics of engineering construction (i.e. the public 
presence) described above. For each of the figures and pieces of information presented 
regarding costs, time and performance during operation etc., triangulation is achieved 
(Bryman and Bell, 2007) on the basis of several independent sources. Most of this material is 
not referenced as it would lead to a very extensive reference list, and some of the material  is 
in Scandinavian languages. The sources range from short newspaper announcements (e.g. 
regarding initiation of a project’s construction activities), to articles in the business press (e.g. 
regarding the contract sum), to business-specific websites (such as www.energy-supply.dk) 
and reports and articles based on research by public wind industry associations and 
universities (such as Gerdes et al., 2005 and Wiezcorek et al., 2012). The available public 
information does have some weaknesses however, resulting for example from difficulties in 
measuring the start and finish of a construction phase and currency conversion.  
 
The study is limited in that it relies on desk research, but it does provide a basis for future 
research. If combined and supplemented more systematically with other methods, it would be 
possible to detect more internal phenomena (such as transfers of resources between projects) 
and capture more details regarding labour and material costs. Three further minor limitations 
should be mentioned – these aspects have not been studied: first, impact on wind power farm 
costs of the limited Danish and Swedish market (Deloitte, 2011; Wieczorek et al., 2012); 
second, the overall economy of the projects, which involves income from negotiated feed-in 
tariffs; and third, the impact of regulation and permission procedures. 
 
Literature Review 
 
This section first encircles the phenomena of offshore wind farms as sociotechnical 
undertakings, and then performs a selective literature review on causes of cost and time 
overrun as well as under-performance in construction projects. This review leads to the 
theoretical framework consisting of an overall, an internal, and an external perspective.  
 
The establishment of offshore wind farms has generated a cluster of installing companies, 
manufacturers, three main clients (DONG, Vattenfall and E.on), operating companies and 
interested citizens (BTM, 2010; Kaldellis and Kapsali, 2013; Wieczorek et al., 2012). 
Therefore, the term ‘offshore wind farm’ is used not only to denote the installations, but also 
the community of social players around them, based on a sociotechnical viewpoint (Hughes, 
1983; Koch, 2007; Latour, 1987, 2005). The power plants encompass installations from 5 
MW capacity and upward, usually consisting of a number of MW turbines with an internal 
cable grid, a sub-station for transforming electricity, and an export cable connecting to a 
national grid (Gerdes et al., 2005; IEA, 2005; Kaldellis and Kapsali, 2013; Snyder and Kaiser, 
2009; Zhixin et al., 2009).  
 
The understanding of offshore wind farms as sociotechnical projects can be further elaborated 
by defining them as complex engineering projects (Davies and Hobday, 2005, p.6) that are 
‘high-cost, technology-intensive, customized capital goods, systems, networks, control units, 
software packages, constructs and services’. The strength of this definition is that it merges a 
business approach (capital goods) with a technical approach, emphasising the scope and 
bundles of technologies associated with the product, and appreciating the interconnection 
with the customer and the service aspect. The downside, however, is that the technology side 
is conceptualised on a too abstract level, and with too little appreciation of the 
intertwinedness of the technical and social. 
 
In their discussion of cost and time overruns in construction projects, Hampton et al. (2012) 
provide a set of seven categories of causes behind delay: client-, contractor-, designer-, 
financial-, labour-, material and plant-related factors. Moreover, they characterise delays in 
terms of excusable, inexcusable, compensable and uncompensable. Thus, through the seven 
categories combined with these characterisations, they allude to the sociotechnical character 
of construction projects and encompass both a project’s external and internal factors. 
Similarly, Love (2011) identifies a series of possible explanations for overrun that encompass 
practice, tasks, circumstances, organisation, system, industry and tools. Love unearths 
internal issues such as design errors and coordination problems. Kaming et al. (1997), look at 
high-rise projects and find a series of causes of overrun such as inflationary increases in 
material costs, inaccurate material estimations and project complexity. For time overruns, the 
main causes of delay are design changes, poor labour productivity and inadequate planning 
(Kaming et al., 1997). All these found factors can be characterised as ‘internal project’ 
explanatory factors. 
 
Flyvbjerg (2009, 2011, 2013) represents a different, externalist approach. He claims that 
especially projects operating in a public-private interface tend to be influenced by political 
mechanisms that lead to a far more complex task for project management. The studies of cost 
and time overruns by Flyvbjerg (2009, 2011) within transport infrastructure (tunnels, roads, 
railroads, bridges) show a long series of examples of considerable overruns. Also in later 
studies, Flyvbjerg and others document similar patterns (Cantarelli et al., 2012; Flyvbjerg, 
2009). Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) showing that cost underestimation is a global and long-term 
phenomenon that does not diminish over time. They also document that cost underestimation 
cannot be explained by error, but rather by ‘optimism bias’ and ‘strategic misrepresentation’.  
 
Optimism bias describes when planners of complex projects underestimate – or are not fully 
aware of – the time and costs necessary to realise a project. Estimations are often based on 
assumptions (Kahneman, 1994). Strategic misrepresentation, as already explained, 
conceptualises the situation when planners and other players involved in planning a project 
purposely reduce the required cost and time and then manipulate the project’s positive impacts 
in terms of its operational performance, benefits and value for future users in order to make 
the project attractive (Flyvbjerg, 2011).  
 
Public and private players, including clients, decision makers, civil servants, engineering 
companies and contractors, who join in alliances to launch a project often practice strategic 
misrepresentation. Project promoters may possess knowledge about how much a client for a 
complex engineering product can afford to pay, or at least the budgetary constraints that may 
exist (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). Such knowledge can be used to accommodate budgets and 
schedules to such constraints rather than to present a realistic calculation of the project risks. 
Also, on a public-private arena, a ‘point of no return’ is likely to exist; once a project is 
initiated, it cannot be stopped in practice, even if it runs short of funding (Flyvbjerg et al., 
2003). The concept of strategic misrepresentation thus involves presenting an argumentation 
to the customer that combines underestimating time and costs and overestimating the 
performance of the completed product (Flyvbjerg, 2009). In relation to wind farm power 
plants, this would be equivalent to overestimating the actual power production, based on 
unrealistically high expectations for production time and availability, and underestimating 
maintenance time and service costs. Flyvbjerg et al. (2009, 2011) argue that rather than 
technical explanations, psychological and political-economic explanations are prevalent, 
which is contrary to other studies of project overrun (Hampton et al., 2012; Love, 2011 a.o.; 
see also Vanston and Vanston, 2004). Political-economic explanations, however, explain 
inaccuracy in terms of strategic misrepresentation, which is more likely to occur in wind farm 
projects than optimism bias, since these projects involve a series of interactions with public 
authorities, the press and the public.  
 
Flyvbjerg’s critics, such as Love (2011), point out that the delimitation of Flyvbjerg’s 
approach and concepts leaves an uncharted space between the initial event and the final 
outcome, since the emergent events, resource limitations, and other aspects of the project 
process that lead to project overruns are not investigated (Love, 2011). Moreover, Love 
(2011) characterises this reasoning of strategic misrepresentation and optimism bias as 
counterfactual causation (Love et al., 2011). By adopting a focus on input and outcome 
measured in time and costs, Flyvbjerg overlooks the content of the project, which is rarely 
fixed as the project develops. 
 
Liu and Napier (2010) claim that optimism bias can be widely found within the construction 
industry. They note: “[…] It has been recognized that in preparing estimates, estimators are 
likely to make ‘self-protective predictions’, influenced by self-interest in securing contracts’ 
(Liu and Napier, 2010). Similarly, contractors’ tender prices are often not only a product of 
the estimating department but also other actors, such as managers, who may intervene to 
reduce bid prices in an attempt to win a contract (Liu and Napier, 2010). Finally, clients may 
strategically underestimate costs to ensure that the project is launched and to obtain funding. 
Therefore, the more internal perspective on cost and time overrun that is represented by 
Hampton et al., (1012), Love (2011), and Kahming (1997) is necessary. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical framework therefore combines the internal and external perspective through 
the overarching perspective of thoroughgoing interpretivism (Grint and Woolgar, 1997), 
which appreciates the dynamic renegotiation of a sociotechnical community like offshore 
wind farms. Thoroughgoing interpretivism implies that the process involves emerging issues, 
unforeseeable events and conditions, decision making under conditions of incomplete 
knowledge and information, as well as processes of negotiation and conflicting interests. 
Tactics are employed in the interaction between stakeholders that include a complex private-
public interaction that encompasses financial, political and public media mediation (Hampton 
et al., 2012). The thoroughgoing interpretive perspective appreciates the indeterminate 
features of cost, time, service provision, contracts and enterprise organisation and strategy, 
and views offshore wind farms as ‘texts’ in an anti-essentialist manner (Grint and Woolgar, 
1997; Sismondo, 2010). Throughout the project’s lifetime, the figures and features 
characterising it are negotiated over and over again, both in the public sphere and internally in 
the contributing companies. 
 
 
The external perspective – strategic misrepresentation 
 
The mobilised external perspective views strategic misrepresentation as a combined practice 
that underestimates time and cost and overestimates the benefits from using the final product 
(Flyvbjerg, 2009). For example, fixed sum contracts generate ‘backwards’ control of expenses 
and/or attempts to enlarge the fixed sum through various types of claims. And project-based 
accounting involves controlling the hours spent using a portfolio of projects and activities 
rather than just one project, which means that project costs are not necessarily allocated to the 
accounts to which they belong.  
 
The internal perspective – operation strategy 
 
The internal perspective builds on operations strategy (Slack and Lewis, 2008), operations 
management (Slack et al., 2007) and project management (Liu and Napier, 2010; Love, 2011). 
It focuses on contracts, planning, equipment and competences. Slack and Lewis (2008) define 
operation strategy in the following way:  
 
 […] the total pattern of decisions which shape the long term capabilities of any type of 
operation and their contribution to overall strategy, through the reconciliation of market 
requirements with operations resources (Slack and Lewis, 2008:18) 
 
The main elements of operations strategy are, according to Slack and Lewis (2008): 
• Capacity Strategy  
• Supply Network Strategy, including purchasing and logistics 
• Process Technology Strategy 
• Development and Organisation 
 
 Capacity Strategy deals with how capacity and facilities in general should be configured. 
In an offshore wind farm context, contracts with wind turbine manufacturers and a range of 
other suppliers are central. Wind turbine manufacturers’ capacity and quality of delivery are 
important; normally, they do not carry out installations directly but contract other companies.  
 
 Supply Network Strategy, including purchasing and logistics, is concerned with how 
operations relate to suppliers and customers. In the context of wind farms, this is understood 
as the configuration of contracts with suppliers of products and processes for erecting the 
offshore wind farms so that the description and analysis disregard relations with clients and 
customers.  
 
 Process Technology Strategy concerns the choice and development of systems, machines 
and processes. This is here simplified into examining the equipment used. 
  
 Development and Organisation is concerned with the long-term decision that governs how 
the operations are run on a continuing basis. In the offshore wind farm context, this occurs 
across projects and is here viewed as an issue of how project organisation is conceptualised 
as well as how competences develop. Competences are seen as a measure of whether the 
operational strategy is developing across projects. Project management also encompasses 
project planning. Project management literature (Atkinson, 1999; Olewale and Sun, 2010; 
Reichelt and Lyneis, 1999) often portrays the balancing of time, cost and quality as a 
question of project management skills and tools that involve various budgeting, cost 
estimation and forecasting and planning techniques; however, the project management 
literature also explains how phenomena like ‘scope creep’ (increase in the number and 
content of project tasks) complicate this. Love (2011) identifies a series of possible internal 
explanations for project overrun that encompass practice, tasks, circumstances, organisation, 
system, industry and tools (including design errors and coordination problems).  
  
To summarise, the social constructivist framework, which combines an external and internal 
sociotechnical understanding of offshore wind farms, provides an appropriate framework for 
evaluating both the external strategic misrepresentation and the internal operations strategy for 
offshore wind parks. These are here condensed into examining contracts, planning, equipment 
and competences. The thoroughgoing interpretivist perspective implies that texts on budget, 
time and costs are continually renegotiated. Moreover, the text approach is taken to mean here 
that even the most detailed components of the technological constellation encompass social 
issues such as cost, design approaches etc.  
 Case Study Analysis: Selected Danish and Swedish offshore wind farms 
 
The seven offshore wind farms investigated in this study are Horns Rev I, Horns Rev II, 
Lillgrund, Middelgrunden, Nysted, Rødsand II and Samsø. Lillgrund is the only wind farm 
placed in Swedish waters, while the rest are placed in Danish waters. Middelgrunden is the 
oldest and began operation in 2001. The youngest, Rødsand II, was operational in 2010. 
 
Place Table 1 Technical features about here 
 
Table 1 shows that there are a number of similarities in the technologies used in the wind 
farms, but also some diversity. They all belong to, what is labelled the 20-20 segment, i.e. 
they are placed less than twenty kilometres ashore in a water depth of less than 20 metres 
(Snyder and Kaiser, 2009).During the period studied here, 2001-2010, offshore wind farm 
technologies became relatively mature and went through further incremental developments, 
which means small differences between the farms over time. In terms of size they fall in two 
groups, the large and the small, which is reflected in the number of turbines (MW production 
capacity) and the absence of substation for the two small. The sample encompasses two farms 
with Vestas 2.0 MW turbines and five with Bonus/Siemens 2.3 MW turbines. The foundations 
are either gravitation or monopoles which were considered as alternative during the design 
phase in all seven cases.  There are also variations in the layout and placement of the turbines 
at the sites – some are in rectangular lines, others in soft curves.  
Place Table 2 Cost about here 
 
Table 2 shows that three out of seven wind farms exhibit cost overruns. Two farms were 
completed with costs exactly as budgeted, whereas two farms used less than budgeted (up to 
10 percent). Four can cautiously be considered to exhibit acceptable performance for clients 
and contractors, also considering uncertainty connected with the calculations.  
 
Place Table 3 Time about here 
 
Table 3 shows that four farms exhibit time overruns compared to the initial schedule, and that 
these overruns exceed 10 percent. Conversely, three farms were completed before time, even 
as much as 20 percent. It is found that the small farms, Middelgrunden and Samsø, with 
relatively short initial schedules, were more vulnerable to unplanned events. Horns Rev 1 
experienced very extensive problems with the turbine technology. 
 
Power production performance during operation 
 
Planned production of wind farm power plants is often expressed by an expected capacity 
factor, the MW-hours to be expected from the MW-capacity provided (Feng et al., 2010: 4; 
Kaldellis and Kapsali, 2013)). The factor is around 35 percent for offshore wind farms 
(BWEA, 2008; Levitt et al., 2011). Danish experiential figures show a ‘lifetime’ capacity 
average of 37 percent for 12 long-term operational offshore farms (DEA, 2011), including 
those examined here (lifetime means from installation some 20 years back to the present, see 
table 4). Four wind farms in the present sample have actual capacity factors that are above the 
average (BWEA, 2008; Kaldellis and Kapsali, 2013, Levitt et al., 2011), and three wind farms 
with actual capacity factors that are below the average. Compared with the simple average of 
29.4 percent for some UK wind farms during the period 2004-2007, most Danish/Swedish 
farms perform better. Only one, Middelgrunden, is significantly lower (25.2 percent compared 
to 35 percent). Both Middelgrunden and Nysted suffer from ‘shadowing’, which reduces their 
power production since less wind is available than anticipated during planning.  
 
The operational offshore wind farm power plants exhibit higher levels of maintenance time 
than planned. All offshore wind farms have scheduled service and maintenance, but the many 
examples of extraordinary unplanned issues lower the wind farm’s availability. These include 
unplanned replacements of generators, gearboxes, cabling, shafts etc. The owners of Samsø 
had to carry out repairs of the export cable in 2004. Vattenfall, owner of Horns Rev, 
announced in April 2010 repair of transition pieces (between the monopile and the tower). 
Such extraordinary repairs affected British wind farms as well (Koch, 2012). 
 
Place Table 4 about here 
 
Discussion 
The discussion below first examines technical features, then costs, time and performance 
during operation. It then moves on to a more general analysis of the results. 
 
The technical features of the farms in the sample share a number of similarities, which makes 
their establishment comparable. For example, the common shallow depth of the water is an 
important enabling and constraining factor for the construction. It requires tackling sand 
banks and the like. Using monopoles or gravitation foundation are considered close 
competitors in shallow waters and was indeed chosen more or less ‘half and half’ here. It 
should be noted however that the construction of the farms spans a period of ten years; 
therefore, due to developments in turbine technology, the technology differs slightly from 
farm to farm. 
  
Three out of seven wind farm construction projects led to cost overruns. Two farms were 
completed with costs as budgeted, whereas two farms were constructed for up to 10 percent 
less than budgeted. In the latter four cases, this can cautiously be seen as acceptable 
performance for clients and contractors, also considering that such calculations involve 
uncertainty. 
 
When it comes to time, four farms experienced overruns compared to the initial schedule that 
exceeded 10 percent. On the other hand, three farms were completed before time, and one 
long before time (20 percent). The small farms, Middelgrunden and Samsø, were initially 
planned with short intense schedules that made them more susceptible to unplanned events, 
which led to overrun in one of them. Horns Rev 1 experienced very extensive problems with 
the turbine technology from Vestas. 
 
Four wind farms perform operationally above the average, meaning they produce more power 
than average. Three wind farms perform below average. Compared to UK wind farms, most 
Danish/Swedish farms perform better. Only one, Middelgrunden, lies significantly lower in 
performance. 
 
The Danish and Swedish cases thus show an interesting mixture of projects exhibiting 
compliance with articulated time and cost budgets and operational goals, and others with cost 
and time overruns and underperformance during operation. There is no difference between 
small and large projects in this small sample. Judging from budgets and schedules, there is 
thus no clear picture of strategic misrepresentation. Lönker’s (2005) findings on the Nysted 
farm even indicate elements of proactive project scheduling by using two summers rather than 
one winter, while compliance with the budget can be said to demonstrate well exercised 
project management. Seen from a thoroughgoing interpretivist perspective, it can even be 
argued that ending up with zero deviation in relation to the budget is conspicuous, since it is 
likely that internal efforts to meet such a goal have been directed toward allocating costs 
elsewhere in the company’s accounts to ensure this result.  
 
Strategic misrepresentation also involves overestimating the benefits of the projects 
(Flyvbjerg, 2009), i.e. overestimating power production on the basis of unrealistically high 
expectations for production time and availability and underestimating maintenance and 
service costs. The present sample does not exhibit important deviances from planned capacity, 
with the exception of Middelgrunden. Two farms are even significantly higher than the 
Danish average (DEA, 2011). 
  
What these cases, along with the UK cases, demonstrate is that the companies are involved in 
gradual development of the operations strategy. This encompasses planning for the weather 
and using onshore assembly of either Siemens or Vestas turbines and barges and jack-up 
vessels as central equipment. Installation methods are improving from single-wing to three- 
wing assembly. And competences are developing as the projects are carried out, yet in a 
sometimes disruptive manner that hampers experiential knowledge being translated and used 
as the companies grow. 
 
Contracts 
 
Project management of the installation phase of offshore farms has to operate under a 
complex set of contracts. For example, Horns Rev 1, realised in 2003, had 69 contracts 
(4Coffshore, 2012), and Horns Rev 2 had 91 (4Coffshore, 2012). Contracts are also 
occasionally reported to involve the main contractor’s representatives directly in the wind 
turbine and (for example) the steel pipe manufacturing processes (Lönker, 2005). Contracts 
for Danish, Swedish and UK wind farms built between 2000 and 2012 all clearly encompass a 
small group of recurrent firms. The multinational firms, Siemens Windpower and Vestas, 
share the installations between them (with 51 percent and 39 percent of the market, 
respectively (Wieczorek et al 2012)), and only in Holland and Germany are other turbine 
suppliers found to be present (Nordtank and RE power; (4coffshore, 2012; Wieczorek et al., 
2012)).  
 
Planning 
 
The projects exhibit examples of both well exercised and less well excercised planning. 
Lönker (2005) finds that the Nysted farm, where planning works well, appears to have 
benefitted from project management personnel recruited from Horns Rev I.  
 
Equipment 
 
While the early farms tended to be erected using ad hoc equipment from the oil and gas 
offshore industry or from bridge building, the later installations use a more and more 
advanced set of specially designed vessels. Up to 60 different vessels are involved in 
installation (Wieczorek et al., 2012), but the A2SEA company continues to have a central 
position in Danish, Swedish and UK wind farms (Koch, 2012). Another important feature is 
the appropriation of harbour facilities, such as the nearby harbour for Rødsand 2, which also 
involves the possibility for onshore assembly of turbines. 
 
Competences 
 
When comparing the development of Danish and Swedish wind farms with the UK farms 
developed over the same period (Koch 2012), it appears less clearly that the centrally placed 
and recurrent companies are learning and becoming more competent with time. A tendency 
exists for some of the more recent wind farms to continue to have time and cost overruns and 
insufficient performance, which is counter to the expected learning curve (Junginger et al. 
2004). The wind turbine manufacturers appear to have considerable problems with quality and 
defects in their deliveries to the UK, which impact on both the installation and operation 
phases (Koch 2012). The worst example in a Danish context is found at Horns Rev I, which 
experiences heavy overruns due to quality problems with Vestas wind turbines. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper was first to develop a combined social constructivist, internal and 
external conceptualisation of the process of constructing offshore wind farms; and second, to 
investigate costs and time delays as well as operational performance results of offshore wind 
farm power plant projects in Denmark and Sweden, with a view to possible strategic 
misrepresentation. The results show that combining the internal and external perspectives 
gives a more precise understanding of why complex offshore wind farms come to operate well 
or less well. This learning alludes to the unique social and technical constellation that such 
undertakings represent, even when investments in similar projects become clustered. 
 The investigated wind farms do not exhibit a clear pattern of strategic misrepresentation. 
Rather, there are examples of project management that emerges as being successful, even 
when the process is disruptive and full of complications. On the Danish, Swedish and UK 
markets, a strong concentration of a few players was found during the period studied and in 
the portfolios of the projects investigated. However, learning effects and development of 
competences exhibit a less clear picture. Some of the farms installed later actually perform 
less well than some of those installed earlier. Across these projects, the construction 
companies seem to contribute in an ambiguous manner to the societal need for efficient 
installation and operation of renewable energy. Renewable energy power plants comprise an 
important societal investment, and this article contributes to a better understanding of their 
cost dynamics and the possibilities for cost reductions seen in the context of social and 
technological conditions. Cost and time overruns and poor operational performance cannot be 
entirely explained through the concept of strategic misrepresentation, since this embraces only 
generic social explanatory elements and disregards the more precise technical (and social) 
content of the project that rests on a strongly contextual set of factors. Future research in this 
area should continue to appreciate the contextual social-technical as well as the 
internal/external elements of constructing offshore wind farms. Increasing the number of wind 
farm projects does not automatically make them generic. 
 
References 
 
4Coffshore (2012), Wind farm data, available at: http://www.4Coffshore.com (accessed 
several times during 2012). 
Atkinson R. (1999), “Project management: cost, time and quality, two best guesses and a 
phenomenon, it’s time to accept other success criteria”, International Journal of Project 
Management, Vol. 17 No. 6, pp. 337-342. 
Byman A. and Bell E. (2007), Business Research Methods, 2nd edition, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
BTM Consulting (2010), “World market update 2010”, available at: http://www.btm.dk 
(accessed February 2, 2011). 
BWEA (2008), Annual Review 2008, British Wind Energy Association, London.  
Cantarelli C.C., van Wee B., Molin E.J.E. , Flyvbjerg B. (2012), “Different cost performance: 
different determinants? The case of cost overruns in Dutch transport infrastructure 
projects”. Transport Policy, Vol. 22, pp 88–95. 
Davies A. and Hobday M. (2005), The Business of Projects. Managing Innovation in 
Complex Products and Systems, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Kaldellis J.K. and Kapsali M. (2013), Shifting towards offshore wind energy—Recent 
activity and future development. Energy Policy vol. 53, February, pp 136–148 
DEA (2011), “Register of wind turbines”, available at Danish Energy Agency website 
www.ens.dk (accessed February 2011). 
De Bruijn H. and Leijten M. (2008), “Megaprojects and contested information”, in Priemus, 
H., Flyvbjerg, B. and van Wee, B. (Eds.) Decision-Making on Mega-Projects’ Cost-
Benefit Analysis, Planning and Innovation, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, chapter 5. 
Deloitte (2011), Analysis on the Furthering of Competition in Relation to the Establishment 
of Large Offshore Wind Farms in Denmark, Deloitte and Garrad Hassan, Copenhagen. 
EWEA (2012), “Green Growth – the impact of wind energy on jobs and the economy”, 
available from the European Wind Energy Association - April 2012 at http:// 
www.ewea.org (accessed November 10, 2012). 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2009), “Survival of the unfittest: Why the worst infrastructure gets built – and 
what we can do about it”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Vol. 25 No. 3, pp. 344-367. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2011), “Over budget, over time, over and over again – managing major 
projects”, In Morris, P., Pinto, J. and Söderlund, J. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Project Management, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 321-344. 
Flyvbjerg B. (2013), “Quality control and due diligence in project management: Getting 
decisions right by taking the outside view”. International Journal of Project Management 
Vol. 31. pp. 760–774. 
Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N. and Rothengatter W. (2003), Megaprojects and Risk: An 
Anatomy of Ambition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Gerdes, G., Tiedemann, A. and Zeelenberg S. (2005), Case Study: European Offshore Wind 
Farms - A Survey for the Analysis of the Experiences and Lessons Learnt by Developers of 
Offshore Wind Farms, Deutsche WindGuard GmbH, Deutsche Energie-Agentur GmbH, 
University of Groningen, Groningen. 
Grint, K. and Woolgar, S. (1997), The Machine at Work, Polity Press, Cambridge. 
Hampton, G., Baldwin, A.N. and Holt, G. (2012), "Project delays and cost: stakeholder 
perceptions of traditional v. PPP procurement", Journal of Financial Management of 
Property and Construction, Vol. 17 No. 1, pp.73 – 91. 
Hughes, T.P. (1983), Networks of Power: Electrification in Western Society, 1880-1930, John 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.  
IEA (2005), Offshore Wind Experiences, International Energy Association, IEA Publications, 
Paris. 
Junginger M., Faaij A., Turkenburg W.C. (2004), “Cost Reduction Prospects for Offshore 
Wind Farms”. Renewable Energy and Wind Power. Vol. 28, No. 1, Pp. 97-118 
Kahneman, D. (1994), “New challenges to the rationality assumption”, Journal of 
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 150, pp. 18-36. 
Kaldellis J.K. and Kapsali M. (2013), “Shifting towards offshore wind energy—Recent 
activity and future development”. Energy Policy Vol. 53, February, pp. 136–148. 
Kaming, P.F., Olomolaiye, P.O., Holt, G.D. and Harris, F.C. (1997), “Factors influencing 
construction time and cost overruns on high-rise projects in Indonesia”, Construction 
Management and Economics, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 83-94. 
Koch, C. (2012), “Contested overruns and performance of offshore wind power plants”, 
Construction Management and Economics, Vol. 30 No. 8, pp. 609-622. 
Latour, B. (1987), Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through 
Society, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
Latour, B. (2005), Reassembling the Social, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Levitt, A.C., Kempton, W., Smith, A.P., Musial, W. and Firestone, J. (2011), “Pricing 
offshore wind power”, Energy Policy, Vol. 39 No. 10, pp. 6408-6421. 
Liu, L. and Napier, Z. (2010), “The accuracy of risk-based cost estimation for water 
infrastructure projects: preliminary evidence from Australian projects”, Construction 
Management and Economics, Vol. 28 No. 1, pp. 89-100. 
Love, P.E.D. (2011), “‘Plugging the gaps’ between optimum bias and strategic 
misrepresentation and infrastructure cost overruns”, Procedia Engineering, Vol. 14, pp. 
1197-1204. 
Lönker, O. (2005), “Operation Offshore”, available at Neue Energie, 2005-1  
http://www.neueenergie.net/index.php?id=731 (accessed November 2011). 
Miller, R. and Hobbs, B. (2005), “Governance regimes for large complex projects”, Project 
Management Journal, Vol. 36 No. 3, pp. 42-50.  
Miller, R. and Lessard, D.R. (2008), “Evolving strategy: Risk management and the shaping 
of mega-projects”, in Priemus, H., Flyvbjerg, B. and van Wee, B. (Eds.), Decision-Making 
on Mega-Projects’ Cost-Benefit Analysis, Planning and Innovation, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, chapter 8. 
Olawale, Y.A. and Sun, M. (2010), “Cost and time control of construction projects: inhibiting 
factors and mitigating measures in practice”, Construction Management and Economics, 
Vol. 28 No. 5, pp. 509-526. 
ONS (2011), “Statistics”, available at Office of National Statistics website 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk (accessed November 2011). 
Reichelt, K. and Lyneis, J. (1999), “The dynamics of project performance: Benchmarking the 
drivers of cost and schedule overrun”, European Management Journal, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 
135-150. 
Renewable U.K. (2010), Annual Review 2010, Inspiring Excellence, London. 
Sismondo, S. (2010), An Introduction to Science and Technology Studies, Wiley Blackwell, 
Chichester. 
Slack, N. and Lewis, M. (2008), Operations Strategy, 2nd edition, Prentice-Hall, Harlow. 
Slack, N., Chambers, S. and Johnston, R. (2007), Operations Management, 5th edition, 
Pearson, London. 
Snyder, B. and Kaiser, M.J. (2009), “A comparison of offshore wind power development in 
Europe and the U.S.: Patterns and drivers of development”. Applied Energy, Vol. 86 No. 
10, pp. 1845-1856. 
Vanston, J.H. and Vanston, L.K. (2004), “Testing the tea leaves: evaluating the validity of 
forecasts”. Research-Technology Management, Vol. 47 No. 5, pp 33–39. 
Wieczorek, A. J., Negro, S.O., Harmsen, R., Heimeriks, G.J. and Hekkert, M.P. (2012), “A 
review of the Western European Offshore Wind Innovation System”, in the Track A 
Transition of Energy Systems proceedings of the IST Conference in Copenhagen, 
Denmark, pp. 72-104. 
Zhixin, W., Chuanwen, J., Qian, A. and Chengmin, W. (2009),”The key technology of 
offshore wind farms and its new development in China”, Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews, Vol. 13 No.1, pp. 216-222. 
 
Table 1 Technical features  
Wind farms Power 
capacity 
Turbine 
 
 
Foun- 
dation 
Water 
Depth 
Infield 
Cable 
 
Export  
Cable 
 
Offshore 
Sub- 
stations 
 MW MW  m kV/km kV/km No. 
Horns Rev I 160 2 M 6-11 30/63 150/21 1 
Horns Rev II 209 2.3 M 9-17 33/70 150/42 1 
Lillgrund SE 110 2.3 G 4-8 33/24 130/7 1 
Middelgrunden 40 2 G 3-6 30/5 30/3.5 0 
Nysted  166 2.3 G 6-10 33/48 132/11 1 
Rødsand II 207 2.3 G 6-12 33/75 132/80 1 
Samsø 23 2.3 M 10-13 30/3.5 30/4 0 
Foundation types: M = monopole, G = Gravitation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Cost Analysis 
Wind farms Power 
Capacity 
MW 
Initial 
Budget 
Mio. Euro 
Actual 
Cost 
Mio. Euro 
Cost 
overrun 
% 
Cost per 
MW 
Mio. Euro 
Horns Rev I 160 229 278 21.4 1.74 
Horns Rev II 209 470 470 0 2.25 
Lillgrund SE 110 167 197 18.0 1.79 
Middelgrunden 40 46 49 6.5 1.23 
Nysted  166 269 269 0 1.62 
Rødsand II 207 450 446 -0.9 2.15 
Samsø 23 33 32 -3.0 1.39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Time Analysis 
Wind farms Power 
Capacity 
MW 
Initial 
time 
Month 
Actual 
time 
Month 
Time 
overrun 
% 
Horns Rev I 160 10 16 60 
Horns Rev II 209 21 17 -19.0 
Lillgrund SE 110 20 23 15 
Middelgrunden 40 4 6 50 
Nysted  166 19 18 -5.3 
Rødsand II 207 20 17 -15 
Samsø 23 7 9 28.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Actual Capacity Factor 
Wind farms Power 
Capacity 
MW 
Year 
 in 
Operation 
Actual 
Capacity 
Factor % 
Horns Rev I 160 2003 39.9 
Horns Rev II 209 2009 46.7 
Lillgrund SE 110 2008 33.8 
Middelgrunden 40 2001 25.2 
Nysted  166 2004 36.1 
Rødsand II 207 2010 42.1 
Samsø 23 2003 38.9 
 
Source: DEA, 2011; LORC, 2012 
 
 
 
 
